Analysis of agency relationships in the design and implementation process of the equity fund in Madagascar by Ayako Honda
Honda BMC Research Notes  (2015) 8:31 
DOI 10.1186/s13104-015-0988-0RESEARCH ARTICLE Open AccessAnalysis of agency relationships in the design
and implementation process of the equity fund in
Madagascar
Ayako HondaAbstract
Background: There are large gaps in the literature relating to the implementation of user fee policy and fee
exemption measures for the poor, particularly on how such schemes are implemented and why many have not
produced expected outcomes. In October 2003, Madagascar instituted a user fee exemption policy which
established “equity funds” at public health centres, and used medicine sales revenue to subsidise the cost of
medicine for the poor. This study examines the policy design and implementation process of the equity fund in
Madagascar in an attempt to explore factors influencing the poor equity outcomes of the scheme.
Methods: This study applied an agency-incentive framework to investigate the equity fund policy design and
implementation practices. It analysed agency relationships established during implementation; examined incentive
structures given to the agency relationships in the policy design; and considered how incentive structures were
shaped and how agents responded in practice. The study employed a case-study approach with in-depth analysis
of three equity fund cases in Madagascar’s Boeny region.
Results: Policy design problems, triggering implementation problems, caused poor equity performance. These
problems were compounded by the re-direction of policy objectives by health administrators and strong
involvement of the administrators in the implementation of policy. The source of the policy design and
implementation failure was identified as a set of principal-agent problems concerning: monitoring mechanisms;
facility-based fund management; and the nature and level of community participation. These factors all contributed
to the financial performance of the fund receiving greater attention than its ability to financially protect the poor.
Conclusion: The ability of exemption policies to protect the poor from user fees can be found in the details of the
policy design and implementation; and implications of the policy design and implementation in a specific context
determine whether a policy can realise its objectives. The equity fund experience in Madagascar, which illustrates
the challenges of beneficiary identification, casts doubts on the application of the ‘targeting’ approach in health
financing and raises issues to be considered in universal health policy formulation. The agency framework provides
a useful lens through which to examine policy process issues.
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User fees for health care services, when combined with
appropriate exemption mechanisms, can, in theory, miti-
gate negative effects on utilisation by the poor as rev-
enue from user fees can be pooled to protect the poor
from the requirement to pay for health services and im-
prove health care programmes and facilities targeted at
this group [1-3].
However, in practice, many exemption measures for
the poor have not succeeded in securing equitable access
to health care services [4]. The failure of such measures
to protect the poor can be attributed to reasons includ-
ing: (i) difficulties in accurately identifying the poor; (ii)
limited awareness of exemption schemes by the poor;
(iii) lack of transparent exemption criteria and proce-
dures which create high transaction costs and uncer-
tainty for those seeking exemptions; (iv) reluctance by
providers to grant exemptions, in part due to a lack of
incentive for them to do so; and (v) reluctance by the
poor to seek exemptions because of social stigma or lack
of motivation to use exempted services [5]. In addition,
exemption measures can cause significant disruptions to
other parts of health systems which are already suffering
from a range of resource and capacity constraints [6].
There are large gaps in the literature relating to the
implementation of user fee policy and exemption mea-
sures for the poor. While a considerable number of stud-
ies measure and analyse the impact of user fees and
exemption measures on health care service demand and
utilisation, few studies examine how exemption schemes
are actually implemented and why many of them have
not produced the outcomes expected. There is a need,
therefore, for studies that examine the implementation
process for user fee policy and fee exemption measures
for the poor and identify problems that arise in imple-
mentation of such policy.
In October 2003, Madagascar instituted a new user fee
policy, FANOME (Fandraisan’Anjara NO Mba Entiko –
Funding for non-stop medicine supplies) that created
“equity funds” at public health centres to subsidise free
medicine for the poor. The 2005 General Policy of the
Government (la Poliltique Générale de l’Etat: PGE) sta-
ted that 80% of the poor should have access to free
medicine through the equity fund scheme. Resources for
equity funds are obtained from medicine sales at the
community pharmacy attached to public health centres.
Management committees, with membership from local
communities, operate and manage the funds. Beneficiar-
ies of the fund are identified by local authorities. An as-
sessment of the equity fund policy outcomes indicated
that while the exemption system was well targeted, with
the mean socio-economic status of equity fund benefi-
ciaries lower than that of non-beneficiaries, both leakage
and under-coverage occurred under the scheme andthere was failure to protect the majority of those in need
from financial burden when accessing health care [7].
This study examines the policy design and the imple-
mentation process for the equity fund in Madagascar in
an attempt to explore factors influencing the poor equity
outcomes of the equity fund.
Methods
Study framework
The process of policy development and execution has
four elements: agenda setting, formulation, implementa-
tion, and evaluation [8]. This process is not necessarily
linear [9].
This paper takes the empirical finding that the equity
fund in Madagascar failed to protect the poor from the
financial costs of illness (a policy evaluation) [7] as its
starting point and seeks explanations in terms of how
the policy was designed and implemented. The policy
design was derived from the formal policy guidelines,
and its implementation from how the formal guidelines
were executed in practice.
The study uses an agency framework to investigate the
policy design and implementation process for the equity
fund from the organisational and institutional perspec-
tives. Specifically, the study examines: (1) principal-agent
relationships established by the creation of the equity
fund; (2) institutional arrangements given to these agency
relationships as reflected in the policy design; and (3)
how the institutional arrangements were shaped in the
course of policy implementation and agents’ responses
to the institutional arrangements in the equity fund
implementation.
An agency relationship is one in which a person (the
agent) acts on behalf of another (the principal). If both
parties in the relationship are utility maximisers, the
principal and agent can have divergent objectives and,
consequently, the agent may not always act in the best
interests of the principal. Therefore, the principal must
structure incentives so that the agent’s best interests,
given those incentives, lead to desirable outcomes for
the principal. Incentive structures are shaped by five cen-
tral elements: resources, information, decision-making,
delivery mechanisms and accountability [10]. These ele-
ments are used to affect institutional and organisational
solutions to principal-agent problems [11]. In this
study, these five elements were applied to analyse the in-
stitutional arrangements reflected in the policy design and
determine how the arrangements were shaped during the
operation of the equity funds at health centres in
Madagascar.
Case study
The study employed a case study approach, a preferred
strategy when ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are posed [12],
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tres was the central unit of analysis. Three equity funds
were selected for in-depth analysis based on the fol-
lowing criteria: (1) exemplary and contrasting outcomes
in utilisation and income in order to obtain robust the-
oretical inferences; (2) different health administrative
districts in order to examine the principal-agent rela-
tionships under different health administrative settings;
and (3) different geographical areas to capture variations
due to location.
Study settings
Field data collection was conducted in the Boeny region,
in north-western Madagascar, in the period between
November 2005 and October 2006. The region includes
six health districts and a population of approximately
543,000 people [13].
Case Studies 1 and 2 operate under the same district
health administration jurisdiction while Case Study 3
operates under a separate administration. Case Study 1
is located in an urban setting. Although in an urban
commune, the location of Case Study 2 demonstrates
both urban and rural socio-economic characteristics and
is regarded as a suburban setting. The location of Case
Study 3 is considered rural.
Data collection
Data were collected through individual interviews, focus
group discussions, structured observation and document
review.
A total of 35 individual interviews were undertaken
with local health administrators, health service provi-
ders, local government authorities and equity fund man-
agers. The interviews were undertaken in Malagasy by
a locally-trained interviewer. A list of semi-structured
questions developed for the interviews covered a range of
issues relating to the equity fund implementation.
A total of 14 focus group discussions were held with
community representatives (members of the health com-
mittee, CoSan (Comité de Santé)), health centre patients
and equity fund beneficiaries. Each focus group con-
sisted of seven to eight participants, selected from differ-
ent geographical areas within each case study district
and with consideration of gender and age balance. The
focus group discussions were facilitated in Malagasy by a
locally-trained facilitator with relevant expertise. A list
of discussion topics was prepared to explore how people
were informed of, became involved in, and perceived
FANOME and the equity fund.
Both the semi-structured interview guide and the
focus group discussions topics were prepared in English
and translated into Malagasy. To assure translation
quality, the translated data collection tools were inde-
pendently back-translated. Both interviews and focusgroup discussions were tape-recorded with participant
consent.
Structured observations took place in a health centre
consultation room and at the community pharmacy,
PhaGeCom (Pharmacie à Gestion Communautaire), at-
tached to the health centre. The observation monitored
how patients, both equity fund beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries, were received by the medical doctor, vali-
dated for equity fund status and provided with prescrip-
tions in the consultation room, and the process by
which patients were received, validated for equity fund
status and provided with medicine at PhaGeCom. In
addition, issues relating to equity fund management at
PhaGeCom were also examined, including: financial
management; management of medicine stocks; and data
collection.
For each equity fund case, observation occurred over a
one-month period. A midwife was recruited to conduct
consultation room observations and a local Non Govern-
mental Organisation (NGO) staff member was employed
to conduct observations at PhaGeCom. Both attended the
health centre on a daily basis and conducted the observa-
tions using a checklist.
The information necessary to document the policy de-
sign, context, and implementation was gathered through
a review of available literature, reports and policy do-
cumentation, primarily sourced from the central gov-
ernment and local health administrators. International
donors who were actively involved in the policy formu-
lation process also provided relevant documents and
reports.
The study received ethical approval from the ethical
committee of Direction Régional de la Santè et du Plan-
ning Familial de Boeny, Madagascar (Ministère de la
Santé et du Planning Familial) and the London School of
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
Data analysis
Audio recordings of interviews and discussions were
transcribed verbatim (in Malagasy) into MS-Word docu-
ments by locally-trained assistants. To assure transcrip-
tion quality, transcriptions were independently checked
against original audio-recordings. Transcriptions were
then translated into French. All of the translated tran-
scriptions were independently checked against the ori-
ginal Malagasy transcriptions to assure the translation
quality. French transcriptions and observation reports
were later transferred to NVivo 7 for analysis.
This research used both a deductive and an inductive
approach to qualitative data analysis. The details of the
agency relationships in the equity fund implementation
was based on the policy design reported in the “FANOME
guide” [14]. The research objectives, the outline of the
agency relationships and the five central elements in the
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provisional list of codes prior to coding.
Issues that were not anticipated during the design of
the research were explored in depth as they arose during
the qualitative data analysis. Thematic analysis was used
to identify additional key issues (themes) that emerged
from the data and involved three overlapping stages: ini-
tial coding; development of a coding scheme; and coding
the data. After coding was complete, relationships be-
tween the themes were explored.
In order to ensure the reliability of the analysis, a team
of local research participants – the individual inter-
viewer, the focus group facilitator and the observer at
PhaGeCom – was formed to review the analysis and
agree upon the codes and categories used in the analysis.Results
In order to understand the equity fund implementation
process and explore factors influencing the equity out-
comes of the equity funds, findings are presented for: (1)
examination of agency relationships established by the
creation of the equity funds; (2) analysis of the policy
design using the agency framework; and (3) examin-
ation of actual practices in the equity fund implementa-
tion by looking at the institutional arrangements that
were shaped during the policy implementation and agents’
responses to those arrangements during the equity fund
implementation.Figure 1 Outline of agency relationships in the equity fund implemenAgency relationships in the implementation of equity
funds
Instituting equity funds for healthcare in Madagascar
established multiple levels of interactions between vari-
ous actors in the policy implementation process. The ac-
tors were classified as: central government; local health
administrators; front-line service providers; local govern-
ment authorities; and citizens. Interactions between the
five groups characterise the principal-agent relationship
(Figure 1) and include:
 Interactions between central government and local
health administrators, and among local health
administrators (principal-agent relationship 1);
 Interactions between actors who take part in the
identification of eligible beneficiaries (principal-agent
relationship 2: beneficiary identification);
 Interactions between actors involved in fee
exemption for medicine at community pharmacies
(principal-agent relationship 3: free medicine
provision);
 Interactions between actors engaged in management
of the equity fund (principal-agent relationship 4:
equity fund management); and
 Interactions between the government and citizens
(principal-agent relationship 5).
The study aims to analyse the equity fund design and
implementation process, with the main focus on policytation.
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and the policy implementation process was restricted to
principal-agent relationships of those involved in the
execution of policy, that is, only those in principal-agent
relationships 2, 3, and 4, particularly those at the district
level and below rather than extending to all potential
principal-agent relationships throughout the system.
Principal-agent relationship 2 concerns those involved
in the identification of equity fund beneficiaries. Identifi-
cation is delegated by the local health administration
through the district health office to the local government
authorities: the commune, fokontany (decentralised vil-
lage unit) and fokonolona (a sub-structure of fokontany).
Specifically, fokontany asks fokonolona to identify indi-
gents in their jurisdiction and to submit a list of indi-
gents to fokontany. The commune asks fokontany to
submit a collated list of indigents from each fokonolona,
with the list validated by the fokontany president. Fur-
ther, the district health office asks the commune to col-
late the lists of indigents from each fokontany in the
commune and validate the list as the official list of indi-
gent beneficiaries for the commune. The district health
office then assigns the commune the task of distributing
the official list back to each fokontany and the health
centre and to distribute identification documents to equity
fund beneficiaries.
Principal-agent relationship 3 involves the delivery of
exempted services and/or goods to beneficiaries. Health
centre medicine prescribers, either medical doctors or
paramedical staff, serve as single agents for beneficiary
validation at health centres. Prescribers keep a copy of
the indigents list in the consultation room and check
whether beneficiary patients who present with identifica-
tion cards are registered on the list. After validation, pre-
scribers provide beneficiary patients with consultation
and examination and prescribe medicine by completing
a “bon de soins,” that is, a voucher for beneficiaries to re-
ceive free medicine. Free medicine provision takes place
at PhaGeCom. A dispenser, who distributes medicine at
PhaGeCom, is recruited and remunerated by the com-
mune and is supervised by the head of the health centre.
The dispenser is required to keep a copy of the indigents
list at PhaGeCom and check whether beneficiary pa-
tients who present at PhaGeCom are registered on the
list. Free medicine is only provided if the name of the
person requesting medicine appears on the beneficiary
list. The dispenser supplies medicine free of charge to
beneficiaries as detailed in the “bon de soins”, which has
been signed by the prescriber.
Principal-agent relationship 4 involves the manage-
ment of the equity fund. A management committee,
CoGe (Comité de Gestion) is created at each health
centre to manage the equity fund. CoGe consists of: (i) a
president and treasurer, who are chosen by CoSan; (ii) arepresentative from the commune, who is appointed by
the mayor; and (iii) a representative from the health sec-
tor, who is usually the head of the health centre. CoGe
are involved in three equity fund management tasks.
Firstly, CoGe must open a bank account that is co-
signed by the treasurer and the commune CoGe repre-
sentative. The cheque book is held by the treasurer and
the bank record book kept by the commune CoGe rep-
resentative to enable monitoring of the account. Sec-
ondly, the CoGe treasurer must transfer 3/135a of total
monthly drug sales revenue from the PhaGeCom ac-
count to the equity fund account. The PhaGeCom ac-
count is co-signed by the president and the treasurer.
Finally, the CoGe treasurer must reimburse the cost of
medicine delivered to beneficiary patients from the
equity fund account to the PhaGeCom account. CoGe
operates under the supervision of the health centre which
sends monthly reports on the operation of FANOME
and the equity fund to the district health office and the
commune.
Agency problems identified in the policy design
The policy design analysis attempted to identify the for-
mal arrangements in the equity fund scheme by examin-
ing the agency relationships, with a particular focus on
the principals’ objectives (i.e. the tasks that agents were
intended to perform, as indicated in the policy design)
and the institutional arrangements that were formed
through the establishment of the equity fund (i.e. the ar-
rangements by which the five elements – resources, in-
formation, decision-making, delivery mechanisms and
accountability – flow between the groups of actors). The
analysis also attempted to identify problems in design
which hold the potential for problems to arise in the im-
plementation of the equity fund.
Beneficiary identification
The principal-agent relationship governing the identifi-
cation of beneficiaries is characterised by the multiple-
agent relationship between the local health administration
(principal) and local government authorities (agents), in
which the identification and validation process is replica-
ted at different levels of the local administrative hierarchy.
The multiple-agent structure in the policy design
makes it difficult for the local health administration (the
end principal) to observe the outcome of each of the
local government authorities’ (agents) behaviour at the
site of beneficiary identification. Consequently, hidden
action problems, wherein the agent’s action is not dir-
ectly observable by the principal and the outcome is af-
fected by the agent’s actions, may arise between local
government authorities and the local health administration.
The problem for the end principal is how to design ins-
titutional arrangements to monitor and influence agents’
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jectives of the principal.
However, the flow of information in the policy design
is not planned in such a way as to allow the local health
administration to observe the behaviour of local govern-
ment authorities at the site of beneficiary identification,
making it difficult for the local health administrators
to determine whether the beneficiaries identified and
validated by the local government authorities meet the
necessary requirements to be listed as equity fund benefi-
ciaries. In addition, local government authority agents are
expected to undertake identification tasks on top of their
everyday workload and without receiving any additional
budget, financial or other types of reward. Consequently,
the local health administration may have limited ability
to influence the behaviour of local administrative agents
during beneficiary identification and the agents may be
inclined to identify beneficiaries in accordance with their
own interests and at the expense of the local health
administration.
Free medicine provision
The existence of heterogeneous multiple principals –
the district health office and the commune – is one of
the main features of the principal-agent arrangements
for free medicine provision. When principals hold differ-
ent objectives and interests, they are likely to compete
for the agent’s favour [15]. To be more attractive to the
agent, the principal needs to structure institutional ar-
rangements to enable the principal to achieve their own
goals while also considering the influence of the other
principal on the agent. In the case of free medicine pro-
vision, the five central elements in the institutional ar-
rangements are mainly designed to flow between the
actors in the health sector, although flows of information
and accountability exist between the health centre and
the commune. Consequently, agents – prescribers at the
health centre and dispensers at PhaGeCom – are likely
to act in favour of the local health administration princi-
pal (the district health office) if conflicts exist in the ob-
jectives and interests of the two principals.
The cost recovery aspect of FANOME creates a source
of funding for purchasing medicinal stocks and other
managerial supplies at both the health centre and Pha-
GeCom, which implies that health facility staff, including
prescribers and dispensers, are not separate from the
conflicting interests of providing free medicine to benefi-
ciaries and raising income for facility operations. Failure
to separate the interests of health facility staff from the
cost recovery aspects of the policy scheme results in po-
tential unwillingness among prescribers and dispensers
to grant free medicine to beneficiaries.
Health centres are responsible to both the district
health administration and the commune, as outlined inMadagascar’s decentralisation policy. However, the role
of the commune in free medicine provision is not clearly
specified in the policy design and, therefore, it is possible
that the commune will not actively involve themselves in
this area of the policy implementation unless there is spe-
cific motivation to drive their participation.
Equity fund management
The core members of CoGe, that is, the president and
treasurer, are elected from the community (CoSan) with
approval from the commune. CoGe is assigned manager-
ial tasks by the local health administration and reports
to the commune, CoSan and the local health administra-
tion on the operation of FANOME and the equity fund.
The agency relationship in this area is considered to be
a multiple-principal case; CoGe, as an agent manages
the equity fund for multiple-principals – the local
health administration, the territorial administration (the
commune) and CoSan. However, the institutional ar-
rangements between CoGe and each of the principals,
and between the principals, in the management of the
equity fund lack clarity in formal policy documents,
such as the FANOME guide. Specifically, while CoGe is
accountable to each of the principals, the majority of
the financial resources provided to CoGe do not come
from the principals but from patients’ contributions to
medicine and family planning purchases at PhaGeCom.
The flow of information, both monitoring and guidance
provision, is specified between CoGe and the health ad-
ministration whereas the monitoring mechanisms be-
tween CoGe and other principals are loosely defined
and remain rather informal.
The main financial resources for operation of the
equity fund do not come directly from the principals but
from patient contributions to medicine and family plan-
ning purchases at PhaGeCom. The CoGe president and
treasurer both receive an allowance from this revenue.
While the mechanism for the health sector principal to
monitor equity fund status is specified within the pro-
cesses of the local health administration, the commune
and CoSan’s roles in monitoring the equity fund are ra-
ther loosely defined – The commune representative in
CoGe reports to the mayor on CoGe operations. An
auditor, who is appointed by CoSan, reviews the finan-
cial management of the fund every three months. How-
ever, how and the extent to which the commune and
CoSan get involved in monitoring activities and how
they use the monitoring reports are unclear.
Although some decisions on the use of drug sales
revenue are made by CoGe, the fixed rates allocated to
medicinal supplies and the equity fund, which account
for 80% of drug sales revenue, are predetermined by
the Health Ministry. Limited involvement of CoGe in
equity fund management was expected to occur due
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tween CoGe and each of the principals and the lack of
decision-making power for CoGe members over equity
fund revenue.
Actual practices in the equity fund implementation
The agency framework was used to examine how the
equity fund policy was actually implemented by compar-
ing the principal’s objectives as described in the policy
design and agents’ behaviour in practice, revealing a num-
ber of problems relating to agents’ behaviour. The insti-
tutional arrangements were considered alongside agents’
behaviour to explore factors influencing the occurrence of
problems during beneficiary identification, free medicine
provision and equity fund management.
Beneficiary identification
As anticipated from the policy design analysis, conflicts
of interest between health administrators and village
level agents (the actors at fokontany and fokonolona
levels) were found in the process of beneficiary identifi-
cation. While the district health office and the health
centre tried to limit the registration of indigents to a
number calculated on the basis of estimated drug sales
revenue at PhaGeCom, village level agents were inclined
to register more indigents from their own neighbour-
hoods on the list.
The institutional arrangements given to the principal-
agent relationships for beneficiary identification were
not shaped in such a way as to direct village level agents
to behave in alignment with the end principal’s interests,
that is, to balance the number of indigents registered
on the list with the amount of money available in the
equity fund. Firstly, due to the absence of a mechanism
for health administrators to monitor agents’ behaviour
at the site of beneficiary identification or fokontany’s
validation of the list, the district health office and the
health centre could only examine the list submitted by
fokontany as the final output of the village level agents.
They could not access the information held by agents
or determine how and under what circumstances the
village level agents actually identified indigents and val-
idated the list.
Secondly, no particular funding or personal financial
rewards were provided for beneficiary identification and
validation of the list. Village-level administrators were
expected to undertake their equity fund tasks as a part
of their everyday work and community participants in-
volved in beneficiary identification in Case Studies 1 and
2, worked as volunteers. Community participants who
undertook beneficiary identification expressed strong
dissatisfaction with their voluntary status and requested
an allowance for their activities. One fokontany president
explained the situation as:…this concerns the motivation of these people who are
married and have children and the activities they
undertake in observing the population [to identify
beneficiaries] take a lot of their time, even days. So I
would like these people to be compensated for the
period they work as they are poor themselves and yet
they must identify the poor. It is as we say in
Madagascar “it is just like two blind people holding
hands”. These people deserve something.
(Individual interview with a fokontany president)
Although not predicted in the policy design analysis,
the equity fund implementation revealed actions taken
by the health administration to re-direct the objectives
of the equity fund policy. The specific objective of the
equity fund announced in PGE in 2005 stated that 80%
of the poor should have access to free medicine, however
the interpretation of the objective communicated by the
Health Ministry to the local health administration fo-
cuses more on the amount of funding available in the
equity fund being sufficient to cover health care costs as-
sociated with 80% of listed beneficiaries than the pro-
vision of free medicine to beneficiaries.
“Provide free medication for 80% of the poor” does not
mean that 80% of the poor will become sick and
receive consultation at CSB [health centre]. This
means that the amount of money available in the
equity fund is sufficient to cover 80% of the [listed]
indigents in any one year.
(Directive issued by MINSAN-PF to SSPFD on 16
January 2006, No 09-SANPF/SG/DDDS/SPC)
In this context, concern about limited resources in the
equity fund was expressed and the importance of the
monitoring financial performance was emphasised.
Watch carefully so that the fund is not exhausted
quickly: set up mechanisms to limit excessive
consultations…, organise income generating activities
[to supplement the equity fund] with the commune or
the region…
(Directive issued by MINSAN-PF to DRSPF on 10
August 2005, No 310 SAN PF/CAB)
The Health Ministry’s interpretation re-oriented the
policy objective by emphasising the financial aspects of
the equity fund performance. In accordance with gov-
ernment’s strong promotion of the equity fund’s financial
performance, local health administrators, including the
district health office and the health centre, were placed
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ing was available in the equity fund.
Of major concern to the local health administration
was the number of indigents registered on the list com-
pared with the amount of money available in the equity
fund. In all of the cases examined, there was a mechanism
which allowed the local health administration principal –
either the district health office or the health centre, or
both – to influence the number of indigents registered on
the list before the commune provided final approval of the
list. This is a deviation from the beneficiary identification
mechanism reflected in the policy design, wherein identifi-
cation of indigents and validation of lists were to be
undertaken within the local territorial administration. In
Case Studies 1 and 2, after fokontany submitted the list
and before the commune gave final approval, the list went
through the district health office and the health centre
where they discussed the number of beneficiaries and
whether or not the equity fund could support all of the
listed indigents considering the estimated drug sales rev-
enue at PhaGeCom. In Case Study 3, before the commune
validated the list, the health centre checked the list and
tried to limit the number of beneficiaries. In all of the case
studies, the health administrators, the end principals, ap-
peared to have de facto decision-making power over the
number of beneficiaries registered on the list.
Village level agents were not happy about the removal
of names from the list and considered it a source of
conflict.
…there were 18 names on my list, and when it came
here [to health centre], they said that they would only
take four. And so she [the doctor] said there is a
limit…I reduced the list to four, because I know the
very poor people…and then the people [the doctor]
returned after that, “three”, she said, and I reduced it
to three…There are three now…This is now creating
conflict with the fokonolona.
(Focus group discussion with fokontany presidents)
In all case studies, village level agents were account-
able to local health and territorial administrators for
beneficiary identification and validation of the list. The
commune, in turn, was accountable to the district health
office, the health centre and fokontany for the provision
of the officially validated list. There was no formal struc-
ture to inform agents at the fokonolona level of the final
list approved by the commune.
In Case Studies 1 and 2, beneficiaries on the final list
were informed of their status during the identification
process and/or during the distribution of identification
cards. Those who were removed from the final list were
not informed of their removal and learned that they werenot on the list when they accessed the health centre. In
Case Study 3, identification cards seemed to be mistakenly
distributed to elderly people and not to beneficiaries.
The scheme was not publicly announced, consequently,
most of the beneficiaries were unaware of the benefits they
were entitled to receive and no clear information on the
scheme was provided to non-beneficiaries. Fokontany pre-
sidents hesitated to publicise the scheme. One fokontany
president said that everyone was equally poor and if the
existence of the fund was announced, many people would
come to the fokontany office with inquiries about how to
ensure inclusion on the indigents list. In fact, in spite of
the lack of publication of the scheme, fokontany received a
number of queries from those who were not listed seeking
to ascertain why they were excluded.
There is no communication [with the citizens about
the equity fund] because everyone is vulnerable. And
once you make a statement, the fokontany will be
overwhelmed…But we cannot make an official
announcement for the poor, because everyone is poor.
(Individual interview with a fokontany president)
Free medicine provision
Prescriber agents appeared to set limits on claims for
free medicine by trying to confirm whether listed indi-
gents who presented at the consultation room were ac-
tually poor or by strictly forbidding beneficiaries from
receiving free medicine more than twice. Consequently,
a number of beneficiary patients did not receive free
medicine when they accessed the health centre. While
health centre staff believed this process necessary as they
considered that some beneficiaries did not appear to be
poor, beneficiaries who did not receive free medicine at
the health centre felt disappointed in the scheme and
often complained to the village level agents.
…“You lie!” they say to you…“One made us buy drugs
there, you say that we do not have to pay, but they
made us buy drugs. And the small amount of money
we have to buy meat goes on drugs.”
(Focus group discussion with CoSan)
As revealed in the policy design analysis, the policy
did not separate the interests of health facility staff from
the cost recovery aspects of the scheme. Health centres
had no own-budget and drug sales revenue provided
funding to purchase medicinal stocks and managerial
tools for the health centre and PhaGeCom. Obtaining a
secure source of funding for operations was crucial for
health centres to effectively manage medicine stocks,
consumable items, and managerial tools. Failure to cover
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To health centre staff, granting free medicine meant a
monetary loss of revenue for the centre and PhaGeCom.
Therefore, it was not surprising that prescribers became
reluctant to provide free medicine, particularly when fa-
cilities already faced financial constraints.
In addition, the mechanism for monitoring free medi-
cine provision was set solely within the health adminis-
tration, whose main concern was that the reserves in the
equity fund be sufficient to cover expenses associated
with 80% of listed beneficiaries. Consequently, strong
emphasis was placed on monitoring the financial per-
formance of the equity fund, which may have led pre-
scribers to become more vigilant about the balance
between free medicine provision and the reserves avail-
able in the equity fund.
Along with the re-orientation of the policy objectives,
the Health Ministry sent a series of directives instructing
health centres to disallow equity fund beneficiaries from
receiving free medicine more than twice and not to pro-
vide free medicine costing over Ar 1,000. (If the prescrip-
tion cost more than Ar 1,000, equity fund beneficiaries
were required to purchase the medicine themselves). Al-
though health centre staff thought that the need to dis-
courage frequent visits by equity fund beneficiaries was
inevitable due to the limited resources in the equity fund,
they found the directives difficult to follow. If a beneficiary
patient had a severe illness or injury, Ar 1,000 was often
insufficient to cover the cost of the medicine required for
treatment.
Because they (the Health Ministry) determined that
the expenditure on a (beneficiary) patient must be
only Ar 1,000 while a patient has, say quite a simple
wound…can you give him some Amox[icillin]? A
packet of Amox costs Ar1,150. And so the patient
cannot have the packet. And if he [his condition] also
gets worse, he has fever, for example, then we cannot
give him paracetamol anymore. This is a simply
strange situation due to the latest rule.
(Individual interview with CSB staff )
In Case Study 3, prescribers often performed no valid-
ation during consultations with beneficiary patients. It
seemed that the prescriber recognised beneficiaries per-
sonally. While most beneficiaries were unaware of the
benefits they could receive at the health centre, there
were some beneficiaries who were aware of their equity
fund status and who made frequent visits to the health
centre. In order to continue to provide free medicine
(more than twice), the head of the health centre gave
these people a prescription under the name of a benefi-
ciary who did not often visit the health centre. The healthcentre appeared to be concerned about frequent visits by
beneficiaries. They thought that once beneficiary patients
became accustomed to receiving free medicine, it was dif-
ficult to convince the patients to start paying again. This
departure from correct procedure was possible due to
the absence of a formal mechanism allowing the district
health office to monitor the behaviour of prescribers at
the site of validation. Consequently, prescribers held
de-facto decision-making power over whether patients
should receive free medicine.
Limited involvement of the commune representatives
occurred in all of the case studies which, as indicated in
the analysis of the policy design, is attributed to the fact
that the institutional arrangements between the commune
and the health sector are unclear – while accountability
mechanisms exist between the local health administrators
and the commune on the performance of the equity fund,
resources only flow within the health sector, prescribers
held decision making power and monitoring mecha-
nisms existed between health centres and the local health
administration.
Equity fund management
The management of the equity fund was affected by a
participation constraint wherein limited involvement of
CoGe members was observed. In addition, correct finan-
cial management procedures were not undertaken and
strong involvement of the health centre in fund manage-
ment was observed.
Participation constraints were found among CoGe
members, particularly in Case Studies 1 and 3. In Case
Study 1, the CoGe president only participated in the
management of medicine stocks at PhaGeCom and the
treasurer and the commune CoGe representative seldom
came to the health centre. In Case Study 3, the newly
appointed CoGe president had not decided yet whether
he would accept the position, while the CoGe treasurer
only worked at the health centre twice a month. The
commune CoGe representative rarely participated in
equity fund-related activities. In Case Study 2, although
CoGe participated in the management of both medicine
stocks and sales revenue at PhaGeCom, the head of the
health centre kept all the managerial tools with her and
CoGe was unable to operate without her.
In addition to the unclear contractual relationships be-
tween CoGe and each of the principals, the institutional
arrangements, particularly those relating to resources,
information and decision-making, can further explain
unwillingness by CoGe to participate in equity fund man-
agerial tasks. In Case Studies 1 and 2, the CoGe president
and treasurer received an allowance while other CoGe
members, commune representatives and health centre
staff, were expected to perform their tasks as a part
of their everyday work. While the allowance appeared
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ticipate in the equity fund management, the commune
CoGe representative may have felt it unfair that they had
to undertake the same activities as the president and
treasurer without receiving an allowance. In Case Study 3,
where no allowance was provided to any of the CoGe
members, the president and treasurer clearly expressed
discontent with their volunteer status and complained
about the lack of financial incentives to participate.
…there is no salary eh! Even if there are people who
want to do the work, if there is no salary then why
should I waste my time there? And I thought this:
What if nobody wants to do it? And so I will do it but
it is only voluntarily, so I will not spend too much time
there but do it once every two weeks. That is why it is
done every two weeks…
(Individual interview with a CoGe member)
Accompanying the inadequate and inequitable finan-
cial incentives, CoGe was not given any decision-making
power over the use of revenue from drug sales – the
source of the equity fund. The fixed share allocated for
the purchase of medicinal supplies and the equity fund
contribution was predetermined by the Health Ministry
and accounted for 80% of the drug sales receipts. There-
fore, even in the policy design, the decision-making power
given to CoGe was limited. Furthermore, in the equity
fund operation, the heads of the district health office and
the health centre appeared to retain the de-facto decision-
making power over the allocation of funds, including over
the remaining 20% of the drug sales revenue over which,
according to the policy design, CoGe was supposed to
have discretion. Consequently, the CoGe’s tasks in the fi-
nancial management of the equity fund were restricted to
administrative chores, such as signing forms or preparing
supporting documents for monthly reports.
Indeed, the expenditure – such as for the purchase of
medicine, transportation expenses, purchase of
management tools – are recorded by both the head of
the CSB [health centre] in a notebook that she keeps
with her, as well as by the treasurer. The head of CSB
authorises all the FANOME-related expenses. The
treasurer only takes care of the disbursements and
filing of supporting documents.
(Observation at PhaGeCom)
These deviations from correct management procedures
offered the opportunity for strong involvement by the
health centre in the management of the equity fund with a
variety of divergences from the guidelines. For instance, inCase Study 2, as the newly elected CoGe treasurer did not
often visit the health centre, the health centre head and
the pharmacy dispenser were temporarily undertaking the
treasurer’s duties. The pharmacy dispenser kept the medi-
cine sales revenue in the safe at PhaGeCom and, on the
15th of every month, the health centre head deposited the
revenue into the bank account of the family planning pro-
gram (not the PhaGeCom account). This practice was jus-
tified as allowing sales revenue to be safely kept in the
bank and enabling the health centre head to withdraw
money from the bank account whenever it was necessary
to purchase medicinal supplies without having to rely on
the co-signatories (the CoGe treasurer and the commune
CoGe representative), who were frequently absent.
Although the equity fund scheme was designed to sep-
arate the authority and funding from health facility staff
by entrusting the fund management to CoGe, in prac-
tice, the health centre was undertaking a large propor-
tion of the equity fund managerial tasks.
In addition, the monitoring mechanism determined
by the health administration emphasised the financial
performance of the equity fund – the district health of-
fice regularly checked monthly monitoring reports which
specified income, expenditure and the balance in the
equity fund. Failure to record sufficient funding indi-
cated poor performance in the operation of the equity
fund. The health centre might have responded to such
a performance monitoring mechanism by actively par-
ticipating in fund management and making sure that
appropriate financial information was recorded in the
monthly reports submitted to the district health office.
The reports did not include mechanisms to allow the
district health office to monitor the behaviour of the
health facility staff and CoGe members in their equity
fund management activities.
Discussion
The analysis of the policy design identified a number of
shortfalls that had the potential to cause problems in
the implementation of the equity fund. In each case
study, most of the problems anticipated to occur from
the examination of the policy design actually occurred
in the implementation of the policy. These problems
concerned monitoring mechanisms, facility-based fund
management and the level and nature of community
participation.
Additionally, issues emerged in relation to actions taken
by the health administrators which re-orientated the pol-
icy objective after the commencement of the equity fund
implementation, changing the emphasis of the equity fund
operations to favour financial performance. In line with
the re-orientation of the policy objective, the flow of the
five central elements of the institutional arrangements was
altered in such a way as to allow intervention by the
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mentation to favour their own interests.
Accordingly, the implementation is not serving the
goal of the equity fund policy, that is, to improve access
to health care for the poor through protection from the
financial burden of paying user fees. The main concern
of the health administration principal is that the amount
of funding available in the equity fund be sufficient to
cover the health care costs associated with 80% of listed
beneficiaries, rather than providing the country’s indi-
gents with access to appropriate health care (or the util-
isation of the scheme by beneficiaries).
Little evidence exists on the success of exemption me-
chanisms to improve access to health care for the poor
and reduce financial burden on the poor [4]. Targeting,
the identification of the poorest or those most in need
of exemption, has proven in practice to be a major
challenge [16-20]. Furthermore, the failure of many ex-
emption schemes has been partly attributed to provider
reluctance to grant exemptions when conflicted between
granting exemptions and raising income, as exempted
patients cause a loss of revenue for facilities already
under financial stress. Consequently, “third-party payer”
systems, including health equity funds, have been crea-
ted in several countries in Asia and Africa as an alterna-
tive exemption approach that incorporates a mechanism
to ensure sufficient funding is available at health facil-
ities and to compensate facilities for the cost of granting
exemptions so that the health provider can achieve both
equity and efficiency [17,21]. Some reviews of this type
of mechanism suggest that adequate health facility or
health administration funding from external sources; an
independent agent determining eligibility of beneficiar-
ies based on clear, agreed criteria; and regular updates
of the beneficiary list are all key to the success of the
mechanism but pre-existing health services must also
be operating with sufficient financial and human re-
sources [17,21,22]. Nonetheless, there are large gaps in
the knowledge relating to the process of implementing
fee exemption measures for the poor at the ground-
level, particularly about how such schemes are actually
implemented and why many schemes have not produced
the outcomes intended. This paper addresses those know-
ledge shortfalls.
The study highlights a number of issues which require
attention from those at the policy-making level. Predom-
inantly, the results suggest that, in order to enable a pol-
icy to realise its objectives in a particular context, careful
attention should be paid to addressing the details of the
policy design and implementation that can influence
policy outcomes.
The study results also provide useful information
from ground-level that should be considered by policy
makers. Firstly, the equity fund experience in Madagascarillustrates the potential risk of simply applying a successful
public policy ‘model’ in a different context. The health
equity fund is a pro-poor health care financing model
that has been successful in other settings in terms of ef-
fectively improving access to health care for the poor
through a reduction in financial burden [17,21]. The re-
sults of this study suggest that the application of health
care financing policy which has been successful in other
settings must be accompanied by a well-planned policy
design and deliberate implementation strategies with
careful consideration given to contextual factors if the
policy is to achieve its goals and objectives. When ap-
plying a ‘successful’ case in other settings, the policy de-
velopment process should carefully look at the actors
who will be involved in the policy implementation, the
capacity of those actors to carry out the necessary tasks
and the relationships between the actors in addition to
giving due consideration to the health system and other
contexts in which the policy is being introduced. This
process should identify potential constraints to policy
implementation and enable a clear implementation stra-
tegy to be developed to address the potential problems.
In the course of implementing the policy, careful, on-
going monitoring of the implementation on the ground
and adjustment or amendment of the policy design
should be undertaken to address unexpected issues.
This requires shared policy objectives between health
administrators at both the central and local levels and
strong commitment by all involved to meeting the po-
licy objectives.
Secondly, there has been on-going debate on whe-
ther ‘universalism’ or ‘targeting’ should be the principle
underpinning the provision of social policy. Whereas
‘universalism’ considers the entire population to be the
beneficiary of social benefits, ‘targeting’ involves ap-
proaches such as means testing or proxy indicators to
determine the eligibility of individuals for social bene-
fits [18]. Empirical evidence reveals, however, that for
health care financing, targeting, that is the identifica-
tion of the poorest or those most in need of exemption
from user fees, has proven, in practice, to be a major
challenge [23], and that the approach entails high admin-
istrative costs and significant administrative sophistication
and capacity [18].
The equity fund experience in Madagascar, which em-
ployed a community approach to target benefits, casts
doubts on the application of ‘targeting’, demonstrating
the complex nature of beneficiary identification, which
resulted in a divergence of interests among those in-
volved in identifying poor households. The village-level
agents were inclined to register too many indigents from
their own neighbourhoods on the beneficiaries list, while
the district health office and the health centre tried to
limit the number of indigents on the basis of estimated
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the socio-economic context of Madagascar, where the
poverty rate is nearly 70%, poses questions as to whether
it is appropriate to employ a ‘targeting’ approach when
most of the population suffers from poverty.
Lastly, the study results suggest dominance of the
health sector (end principal) in the management of the
equity fund and difficulty in obtaining genuine participa-
tion from the community. In addition to the inadequate
financial incentives offered to the community CoGe rep-
resentatives, no decision-making power was given over
drug sales revenue, the source of the equity fund. In-
stead, the heads of the district health office and the
health centre retained decision-making power over the
allocation of funds. Consequently, CoGe’s tasks in the
financial management of the equity fund were limited
to administrative chores. The study results imply that
in order to achieve effective community participation,
careful consideration needs to be paid to the roles of
community participants and other actors involved in
the policy execution and the degree to which decision-
making authority, resources and collective tasks are
shared.
Using the agency framework to examine the policy de-
sign helped identify problems that could be anticipated
to arise in the policy implementation. In fact, many of
the agents’ behaviour-related problems that actually oc-
curred in the equity fund implementation were identified
as principal-agent problems and were predicted to arise
due to limitations in the policy design.
In addition to identifying problems in the policy de-
sign, the agency framework was useful in the analysis of
policy implementation practices to identify problems re-
lating to the behaviour of actors involved in the policy
implementation. Major problems in agents’ behaviour
were explained by how the five central elements in the
institutional arrangements, i.e. resources, information,
decision-making, delivery mechanisms and accountabil-
ity, were structured in the principal-agent relationships.
However, the agency framework used in this study is
not without limit. As this paper aims to analyse the de-
sign and implementation process of the equity fund, the
main focus of the study is policy execution. Therefore,
the scope of this study is restricted to the principal-
agent relationships of those who undertake tasks related
to the equity fund implementation, particularly those at
the district level and below. Consequently, the possibility
exists that important factors outside the scope of this
study may have influenced the policy outcomes but these
factors were not included in the analysis. Resolution of
this problem requires expansion in the scope of the
agency framework to encompass other relationships in
the policy formulation and implementation, for exam-
ple, the relationship between the central governmentand local health administrators and between the gov-
ernment and citizens.
Few studies have applied agency theory to analysing
health systems in low and middle income countries [24-27],
although a number of studies have applied principal-agency
theory to analysing health care management in higher in-
come countries [28-31]. More studies utilising agency ana-
lysis are required to further understand the relevance and
contribution of the agency perspective to health systems
research.
Lastly, the data collection undertaken in this study
took place several years ago and the author understands
the reader’s concerns about the ‘freshness’ of the infor-
mation and the discussion provided in this paper. How-
ever the author strongly believes that the study results:
(1) contain invaluable messages from ‘on-the-ground’
experience of implementing a pro-poor health care fi-
nancing policy in Madagascar, one of the least developed
countries in Africa; (2) contribute to filling gaps in the
literature relating to how user fee policy and exemption
measures for the poor are actually implemented and
why many of them have not produced the outcomes ex-
pected; and (3) present an innovative use of an agency
framework to investigate the design and implementation
of the equity fund policy in Madagascar.Conclusion
This study used agency theory to confirm that shortfalls
in the policy design, the re-orientation of the policy ob-
jective and the re-shaping of institutional arrangements
in the implementation of the equity fund in Madagascar
all contributed to poor equity performance of the equity
fund. The study results provide warning of potential
risks in simply employing a successful public policy
‘model’ in a different context and suggest that, in order
to determine whether a policy can realise its objectives,
it is necessary to ascertain the implications of the policy
design and implementation in a particular context. The
equity fund experience in Madagascar, which illustrates
the challenges of beneficiary identification, feeds into
international debate on ‘universalism’ and ‘targeting’ in
health financing and raises issues to be considered in the
formulation of universal health policy. Lastly, effective
community participation requires careful consideration
of the roles, resources and decision-making authorities
shared by the community participants and other actors.Endnote
aAt PhaGeCom, medicines are sold to patients at a
margin of 35% of the price fixed at the national level [14].
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